This paper studies the effect of malapportionment on policymaking. I argue that in malapportioned chambers, policymaking is biased in favor of overrepresented districts via a mechanical and a behavioral effect. Using data on the Italian Senate and a regression discontinuity design, I first show that two-tier electoral systems can cause malapportionment by allowing districts with similar population size to elect a different number of legislators. I then demonstrate that the local interests of overrepresented districts receive disproportionately greater attention in bill sponsorship. The effect is driven not only by the election of the additional legislator but also by the increased activism of electorally vulnerable legislators from overrepresented districts. Both geographically targeted and sectoral bills contribute to this bias. The results demonstrate the political consequences of unequal geographic representation.

This article proposes a novel theory of minority status and support for supranational integration. We argue that the gap in status and opportunities between majority and minority individuals affects the evaluation of international institutions. Individuals whose socioeconomic status and opportunities are restricted because of minority traits are more dissatisfied with national institutions and more favorable toward supranational integration than their majority counterparts. We test our theory on the European Union, the most advanced case of regional integration. Using different operationalizations of minority status and an exact matching strategy we demonstrate a robust positive association between minority status and support for supranational integration. Testing the mechanisms, we present evidence that integration in the host country and discrimination drive these effects.